Abstract. Ciphertext policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) is a technique in which user with secret key containing attributes, only able to decrypt the message if the attributes in the policy match with the attributes in secret key. The existing methods that use reasonably computable decryption policies produce the ciphertext of size at least linearly varying with the number of attributes with additional pairing operations during encryption and decryption. In this paper, we propose a scheme in which ciphertext remains constant in length, irrespective of the number of attributes. Our scheme works for a threshold case: the number of attributes in a policy must be a subset of attributes in a secret key. The security of propose scheme is based on Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem.
Introduction
Encryption is the one of primitive that provides security and confidentiality to the digital communications. In traditional symmetric key cryptography (SKC), the sender and receiver both share the same secret key. However, use of the SKC is besieged with the problems related to the key distribution and management. On the other hand, the Public Key Cryptography proposed to circumvent key management issues is not efficient in a multicast setup as also for bulk encryption/decryption [1] . However, the PKC suffers from the complexity in key assignment and certificate management issues.
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) was proposed to obviate the need for a user to a priori possess a certificate obtained using PKI. IBE, proposed first in [2] relies on using the global identities of a user as his public key, with the corresponding (i.e. associated with his identity) private key being assigned by a globally trusted Key Generation Centre (KGC) after due authentication of a user. Any user could encrypt a message using the global identity of the destined user, whereas a user, whose identity in his secret key matches with the same in the ciphertext, would be alone able to decrypt the same.
In the traditional IBE systems, the identity of a user is specified using either the name, the email ID, or the network address -a string of characters. This makes it cumbersome to establish the necessary correlation between a user's identity (in his private key) and the same associated in the ciphertext that he intends to decrypt. This is so, because even slight mismatch would render the match as a failure.
Hence, in a variant of the traditional IBE, the identity is specified in the form of descriptive attributes. In the first of such scheme proposed as Fuzzy Identity Based Encryption (FIBE) in [3] , a user with identity W could decrypt the ciphertext meant for a user with identity W', if and only if |W -W'| > d, where d is some threshold value defined initially.
In [4] , the authors propose more expressive ABE schemes in the form of two different systems viz. Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE). In KP-ABE, a ciphertext is associated with a defined set of attributes and user's secret key is associated with a defined policy containing those attributes. Hence, the secret key could be used successfully only if the attributes in access structure policy defined in the key matches with the attributes in the ciphertext. In [5] authors propose a fully functional Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) in which a user's secret key is associated with a defined set of attributes and the ciphertext is associated with a defined policy. In [6] , the authors propose a protocol for conversion from KP-ABE to CP-ABE. One of the limitations of CP-ABE schemes is that the length of ciphertext is dependent on the number of attributes. That is, with s being the number of attributes involved in the policy, the ciphertext length is O (s 3 ). All of these approaches use a single authority while ensuring either variable or constant ciphertext length with/without collusion resistance. In a single authority system, the entire trust is on the single authority, so if the authority is compromised then the entire system is compromised as well as there is overhead on CA for key management.
To deal with single point of failure the traditional approach followed in distributed systems is to distribute the responsibility amongst multiple entities. In [20] , the authors indeed propose the idea of multi-authority system in which there are arbitrary numbers of attribute authorities (AA) with one central authority (CA). Obviously, such schemes require mutual trust between the AAs and the CA. In [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] authors propose different approaches to deal with the limitations of the multi authority system.
Constant Ciphertext length
In CP-ABE size of ciphertext and secret key will increases linearly with number of attributes in policy, so this will increase the communication overhead. The practical data given in Table 1 shows that for larger number of attributes the computation and communication overhead will create problem for system. In addition, the number of pairing operation will increase during encryption and decryption, which increase computation overhead on sender and receiver [11] . One of the efficient constructions of the CP-ABE in terms of ciphertext length can be found in the [7] [8] . In that the size of ciphertext depending linearly upon the number of attributes. For example in threshold scheme, where there are t or more attributes required to decrypt by user, then the size of ciphertext in [7] is and in [8] . Both scheme use secret sharing scheme by Shamir [9] and uses the monotonic access structure. All the approaches mentioned so far achieve the security in the generic model. In [10] authors achieve the full security but size of ciphertext was . In [11] authors proposed the constant length ciphertext using the threshold system. So this scheme suffer with the problem that number of attributes in user's secret key is same as the number of attributes in policy, this scheme achieves constant length ciphertext as well as constant length secret key length. In [12] authors proposed the constant length ciphertext in threshold ABE based on the dynamic threshold encryption scheme from [13] .
One of the essential feature of ABE system is they must be collusion resistance so the users cannot combine to get the decrypted ciphertext which is not entitled for them. In addition, this feature can be very handy in many applications. The notion of ABE without this property under different names: [14] [15]. This notion is somewhat similar to primitive of distributed dynamic IBE [16] [17][13] [8] , in this one sender selects ad-hoc set of identities and define access structure on this one, Users associated with certain identities in the access structure can combine to decrypt the ciphertext.
Our contribution: Our focus here in this paper is on investigating whether is it possible to ensure constant length ciphertext in ABE scheme with collusion resistance using single authority? We attempt to propose the collusion resistant privacypreserving single authority scheme which contain the constant size ciphertext also it require fixed number of pairing operation during the decryption irrespective of attributes. However, our approach necessitates that the attributes in the ciphertext must be a subset of user's attributes in his secret key. For example, if we had one user Harry with attributes "Name=Harry", "University = Stanford", "Branch = EE". In this scenario, if some arbitrary sender sends a message to all the EE branch students of Stanford University, Harry would be able to decrypt the message because the number of attributes in his policy is the subset of the user's attributes. We propose a protocol for the purpose. The security of our protocol is based on DBDH assumptions. We had modified the approach of [11] to increase the efficiency, so our protocol's security is also based on DBDH assumption. In [12] the number of pairing operations required for encryption and decryption is more as compared to our proposed scheme. The detailed comparison of our scheme with previous schemes is discussed in section 4.
Organization of the paper: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we give the preliminaries which we use throughout the paper and the DBDH problem. In third section, we had given our proposed approach. Fourth section gives the security analysis of our approach. In fifth section the comparison of our approach with existing approaches is given. Last section concludes the paper and references are at the end.
Preliminaries
This section provides the required definitions, the computational hardness assumptions, proposed construction and selective game for it.
Notations
Most cryptographic protocol requires randomness, for example generating random secret key. We use x R A to represent the operation of selecting element x randomly and uniformly from element set A. At some places we use " ϕ " to denote the NULL output. This paper deals with the computational security setting where security was defined based on the string length. For £ N where N is the set of natural numbers, 1 £ denotes the strings of length £. If x is a string then │x│denotes its length, e.g. │1 £ │=£.
Attribute based encryption

Bilinear Group
The security of the CP-ABE system is based on the algebraic group called bilinear groups, which are group with bilinear map. Definition 2.1 (Bilinear map). Assume G1,G2 and G3 are three multiplicative cyclic group of some prime order p. A bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → G3 is a deterministic function which takes as input one element from G1, one element from G2, and output an element in group G3, which satisfies the following criteria a) Bilinearity : For all x G1, y G2, a,b , e (x a ,y b )=e (x,y) ab . b) Non degeneracy: e ( 1, 2) ≠ 1 where 1 and 2 are generator of G1 and G2 respectively. c) e must be computed efficiently.
Definition 2.2 (Discrete Logarithm Problem).
Given two group elements and h, find an integer a such that h= a whenever such integer exist. 
Proposed construction
CP-ABE consists of four polynomial algorithms as follows.
Setup (
: It will take implicit security parameter k and output public parameter MPK and master key MSK.
KeyGen (MSK, S):
The key generation algorithm run by Central Authority (CA), takes as input the master key of CA and the set of attributes S for user and then generates the secret key SK.
Encrypt (MPK, M, A):
The encryption algorithm takes as input the message M, public parameter MPK and access structure A over the universe of attributes. Generate the output CT such that only those users who had valid set of attributes which satisfy the access policy can only able to decrypt. Assume that the CT implicitly contains access structure A. 4. Decrypt (MPK, CT, SK) : The decrypt algorithm run by user takes input the public parameter MPK, the ciphertext CT contains access structure A and the secret key SK containing attribute set S. If S satisfies the access tree then algorithm decrypt the CT and give M otherwise gives "ϕ".
Selective Game setup
Initialization: The adversary A will sends the challenge access structure W* to the challenger. In this section we have given the proposed constant ciphertext length CP-ABE scheme where attributes in the policy must be a subset of attributes in user's secret key. Here = group of large prime order p. Group G and G1 of cyclic multiplicative group of prime order p. Assume be the set of all possible attributes in universe. Assume be the set of all possible values for where . Assume be a set of attributes for user and is an access structure. Here is the admissible bilinear map function (as per Definition 2.1). We assume that t and t' is the two different universal hash function in random oracle which maps such that ≠ . t is only known to CA. (ii) If Z=e(g,g)
z then A has no advantage to distinguish bit , hence
From (i) and (ii) it follows that X's advantage in this DBDH game is (1-).
Currently we had used symmetric bilinear map in this proof. our scheme can also be proven with asymmetric bilinear map like e: G 1 G 2 GT over MNT curve [18] , where G 1 and G 2 are two different groups, in this case we can also prove the indistinguishability under DBDH assumptions over G 2 [19] .
Analysis of approach
For the sack of clarity we omit the detailed discussion on the previous approach we had given the comparison based on size of public key (MPK), Master key (MSK), secret key of user (SK) and ciphertext (CT) in table 2. Here n is total number of attributes, N'= total number of attributes in the system i.e. N'=∑ where is the number of possible values for attribute i, G1,G2 and GT are bilinear groups, the notation | G| shows the bit-length of the element belongs to group G, the notations kG and kC e for some k>0, shows the k times calculation over the group G and pairing operations respectively, r 1 is the set of attributes associated with ciphertext and r 2 is the set of associated with secret key length. Here r 1 can be fixed but r 2 will be different for each user. The figures in the table show the maximum value for the given approach. Table 3 shows the expected computational time based on the input parameters for the different approach. Table 4 shows the properties for the approaches. Table 5 shows the type of access structure that used in the policy construction. The results given in all tables clearly indicate that our scheme is better than any of the previous approaches.
Scheme
MPK MSK SK CT [21] (n +1)G 1 +2G T (n +1)C e +(n +1)G T [5] (2r 1 +1)G 1 +2G T 2r 1 C e +(2r 1 +2)G T [21] (2N'+1)G 1 +2G T (3n +1)C e +(3n +1)G T [22] (1 + 3r 1 n)G 1 +2G T (1 + n + r 1 )C e +(3r 1 − 1)G 1 +3G T [11] (n +1)G 1 +2G T 2C e +2G T [12] (n+t+1) G 1 3C e + (t 2 )G T + O(n) multiplication for Aggregate function Our scheme (n+4) G 1 3C e + 2 G 1 Scheme Nature of Policy [3] Threshold Structure [4] Tree-based Structure [21] AND-gates on positive and negative attributes with wildcards [5] Tree-Based Structure [21] Linear Structure [22] AND-gates on multi-valued attributes with wildcards [11] AND-gates on multi-valued attributes [12] AND-gates on multi-valued attributes Our scheme AND-gates on multi-valued attributes Table 5 : Expressiveness of policy
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we propose the constant ciphertext length approach where the number of attributes in ciphertext policy must be a subset of attributes in the receiver's secret key. Our approach is based on the AND-gates with multivalued attributes. Our scheme does not provide recipient's anonymity. In future, we make this scheme for threshold ABE and add feature like the recipient's anonymity to increase the security. One can apply this notion to the KP-ABE scheme to get the better bounds on the size of ciphertext or size of secret key length. All this work is to be considered as future work.
